New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)

Ponente: BRENAN J.

Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Alabama

ISSUE: to determine the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct

Facts:

L. B. Sullivan is one of the three elected Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama. He brought a civil libel action against 4 individual petitioners, who are Negroes and Alabama clergymen, and against petitioner the New York Times Company.

Respondent's complaint that he had been libeled by statements in a full-page advertisement carried in the New York Times on March 29, 1960.  Entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices."

paragraph 3:

In Montgomery, Alabama, after students sang "My Country, 'Tis of Thee" on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled from school, and truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When the entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to re register, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to starve them into submission.

paragraph 6:

Again and again, the Southern violators have answered Dr. King's peaceful protests with intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home, almost killing his wife and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven times -- for "speeding," "loitering" and similar "offenses." And now they have charged him with "perjury" -- a felony under which they could imprison him for ten years.

He contended:

•      that the word "police" in the these paragraphs referred to him

•     the paragraphs would be read as accusing the Montgomery police, and hence him, of answering Dr. King's protests with "intimidation and violence"

Respondent and six other Montgomery residents testified that they read some or all of the statements as referring to the R in his capacity as Commissioner.

Peitioners' contentions:

• the state law imposes invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press.

Circuit Court of Montgomery County awarded Respondent Sullivan damages of $500k against all the petitioners. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the decision and rejected petitioners' constitutional contentions by saying that:

The 1st Amendment does not protect libelous publications,  and

The 14th Amendment is directed against State action, and not private action.

Hence this certiorari to the Supreme Court.

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Addt'l Facts:

•      Some of the statements contained in the two paragraphs were not accurate

•      No one at the Times made an effort to confirm the accuracy of the advertisement

•      Each of the individual petitioners testified that he had not authorized the use of his name, and that he had been unaware of its use until receipt of respondent's demand for a retraction.

•      None of the individual petitioners responded to the demand, primarily because each took the position that he had not authorized the use of his name on the advertisement, and therefore had not published the statements that respondent alleged had libeled him.

•     The Times did not publish a retraction in response to the demand. The Times did, however, subsequently publish a retraction of the advertisement upon the demand of Governor John Patterson of Alabama.

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Alabama's libel law's rule of liability

•      A publication is "libelous per se" if the words "tend to injure a person . . . in his reputation" or to "bring [him] into public contempt"

•      The jury must find that the words were published "of and concerning" the plaintiff, but, where the plaintiff is a public official, his place in the governmental hierarchy is sufficient evidence to support a finding that his reputation has been affected by statements that reflect upon the agency of which he is in charge.

•      Once "libel per se" has been established, the defendant has no defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their particulars.

•      Unless he can discharge the burden of proving truth(in short, malice is presumed), general damages are presumed, and may be awarded without proof of pecuniary injury.

•      A showing of actual malice is a prerequisite to recovery of punitive damages, and the defendant may, in any event, forestall a punitive award by a retraction meeting the statutory requirements.

•      Good motives and belief in truth do not negate an inference of malice, but are relevant only in mitigation of punitive damages if the jury chooses to accord them weight.

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IMPORTANT POINTS to clarify

(1) 14th Amendment is directed against State action, and not private action.

This proposition has no application to this case. Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, Ps contesting that the law imposes invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute. The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has, in fact, been exercised.

(2) The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press are inapplicable here, at least so far as the Times is concerned, because the allegedly libelous statements were published as part of a paid, "commercial" advertisement.

The publication here was not a "commercial" advertisement. It communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern. That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold.

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WON this rule of liability, as applied to an action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct, abridges the freedom of speech and of the press that is guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

HELD: Yes

(1) The present advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public issues of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection. The question is whether it forfeits that protection by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its alleged defamation of respondent.

(2) Erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the "breathing space" that they "need . . . to survive,”.

Cases which impose liability for erroneous reports of the political conduct of officials reflect the obsolete doctrine that the governed must not criticize their governors. . . . The interest of the public here outweighs the interest of appellant or any other individual.

Where judicial officers are involved, this Court has held that concern for the dignity and reputation of the courts does not justify the punishment as criminal contempt of criticism of the judge or his decision. If judges are to be treated as "men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate," surely the same must be true of other government officials, such as elected city commissioners. Criticism of their official conduct does not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective criticism, and hence diminishes their official reputations.

(3) Madison: the Constitution created a form of government under which "The people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty."

        "the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people."

(4) Alabama law of civil libel is a form of regulation that creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that attend reliance upon the criminal law.

•      The fear of damage awards under a rule invoked by the Alabama courts is markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute.

•      The judgment awarded in this case -- without the need for any proof of actual pecuniary loss -- was one thousand times greater than the maximum fine provided by the Alabama criminal statute.

•      Since there is no double jeopardy limitation applicable to civil lawsuits, this is not the only judgment that may be awarded against petitioners for the same publication

(5) The state rule of law is not saved by its allowance of the defense of truth.

A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions -- and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount -- leads to a comparable "self-censorship." Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.

(6) The constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice" -- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

(7) The rule that where general damages are concerned malice is presumed is inconsistent with the federal rule. "The power to create presumptions is not a means of escape from constitutional restrictions,"  "the showing of malice required for the forfeiture of the privilege is not presumed but is a matter for proof by the plaintiff. . . ."

(8) Applying the actual malice test: the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands, and hence that it would not constitutionally sustain the judgment for respondent under the proper rule of law.

The evidence was constitutionally defective in another respect: it was incapable of supporting the jury's finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made "of and concerning" respondent.

•      Respondent relies on the words of the advertisement and the testimony of six witnesses to establish a connection between it and himself.

•      There was no reference to respondent in the advertisement, either by name or official position.

DECISION: The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

HOLDINGS:

We hold that the rule of law applied by the Alabama courts is constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.

We further hold that, under the proper safeguards, the evidence presented in this case is constitutionally insufficient to support the judgment for respondent.