Guingguing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128959, September 30, 2005
Ponente: TINGA J.
Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
On 13
Oct 1991, Segundo Lim caused the publication of records of criminal cases filed
against Cirse Choy Torralba as well as photographs of the latter being arrested
in a plush uptown hotel in Cebu. These were published by means of a one-page
advertisement paid for by Lim in the Sunday Post, a weekly publication edited
and published by Ciriaco Boy Guingguing.
The Sunday Post was circulated in the province of Bohol, as well as in the Visayas and Mindanao.
Cirse Choy Torralba was a broadcast journalist who handled two programs for radio stations DYLA and DYFX.
Consequently, Torralba filed before RTC Cebu City a criminal complaint for libel against Lim and Guinguing. He asked for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages + attorneys fees. He argued that:
• The publication
placed him in public contempt and ridicule.
• It was also
designed to degrade and malign his person and destroy him as a broadcast journalist.
Lim, in his defense, argued that:
• Complainant was
making scurrilous attacks against him and his family. Since he had no access to
radio time, he opted for paid advertisements via newspaper to answer the
attacks,as a measure of self-defense.
• Complainant, as
a media man and member of the fourth estate, occupied a position almost similar
to a public functionary and should not be onion-skinned and be able to absorb
the thrust of public scrutiny
RTC found Guingguing and Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. On appeal, the CA modified the penalty imposed but it affirmed the RTC's finding of guilt. Hence this petition.
Petitioner's
contentions:
• As
editor-publisher of the Sunday Post and as a member of the fourth estate, the
lower courts finding of guilt against him constitutes an infringement of his
constitutional right to freedom of speech and of the press.
• Lower courts
also failed to appreciate their invocation of self-defense.
WON
the publication is libelous.
Held:
No.
(1)
the First Amendment was designed to protect expression even at its most
rambunctious and vitriolic form.
(2) New York Times v. Sullivan established that a public official may not successfully sue for libel unless the official can prove actual malice, which was defined as with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. Lleeway was allowed even if the challenged statements were factually erroneous if honestly made.
Garrison v. Louisiana held that
In any event, where the criticism is of
public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private
reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the
Constitution, in the dissemination of truth. . . .
Moreover,
even where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution
which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse
consequences to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts expanded the actual malice test to cover not just public officials, but also public figures.
The public figure concept was later qualified in the case of Gertz v. Welch, Inc., which held that a private person should be able to recover damages without meeting the New York Times standard. In doing so, the US SC recognized the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation.
(3) We accepted in this jurisdiction the principles enunciated in these US cases specifically in New York Times and Garrission; Vasquez v. CA; Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong; Borjal v. CA.
(4) As applied to the present petition, there are two main determinants: whether complainant is a public figure, and assuming that he is, whether the publication of the subject advertisement was made with actual malice.
• Cirse Choy
Torralba is a public figure. He is a broadcast journalist hosting two radio
programs aired over a large portion of the Visayas and Mindanao.
• As complainant
was a public figure, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove actual
malice on the part of Lim and P when the latter published the article subject
matter of the complaint. Set otherwise, the prosecution must have established
beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants knew the statements in the
advertisement was false or nonetheless proceeded with reckless disregard as to
publish it whether or not it was true.
It
should thus proceed that if the statements made against the public figure are
essentially true, then no conviction for libel can be had. Any statement that
does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full
constitutional protection. An examination of the records of this case showed
that the precis of information contained in the questioned publication were
actually true
(5) It may have been inconvenient for the complainant that these matters may have been divulged, yet such information hardly falls within any realm of privacy complainant could invoke, since the pendency of these criminal charges are actually matters of public record.
The
information, moreover, went into the very character and integrity of
complainant to which his listening public has a very legitimate interest.
Complainant hosts a public affairs program, one which he himself claimed was
imbued with public character. By entering into this line of work, complainant
in effect gave the public a legitimate interest in his life. He likewise gave
them a stake in finding out if he himself had the integrity and character to
have the right to criticize others for their conduct.
(6) In convicting the defendants, the lower courts paid particular heed to A354 of the RPC, which provides that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. This provision, as applied to public figures complaining of criminal libel, must be construed in light of the constitutional guarantee of free expression, and this Courts precedents upholding the standard of actual malice with the necessary implication that a statement regarding a public figure if true is not libelous. The provision itself allows for such leeway, accepting as a defense good intention and justifiable motive. The exercise of free expression, and its concordant assurance of commentary on public affairs and public figures, certainly qualify as justifiable motive, if not good intention.
DECISION: CA's decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Petitioner is ACQUITTED
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