Guingguing v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128959, September 30, 2005

Ponente: TINGA J. 

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA

Facts:

On 13 Oct 1991, Segundo Lim caused the publication of records of criminal cases filed against Cirse Choy Torralba as well as photographs of the latter being arrested in a plush uptown hotel in Cebu. These were published by means of a one-page advertisement paid for by Lim in the Sunday Post, a weekly publication edited and published by  Ciriaco Boy Guingguing.

The Sunday Post was circulated in the province of Bohol, as well as in the Visayas and Mindanao.

Cirse Choy Torralba was a broadcast journalist who handled two programs for radio stations DYLA and DYFX.

Consequently, Torralba filed  before RTC Cebu City a criminal complaint for libel against Lim and Guinguing. He asked for moral, compensatory and exemplary damages + attorneys fees. He argued that:

     The publication placed him in public contempt and ridicule.

     It was also designed to degrade and malign his person and destroy him as a broadcast journalist.

Lim, in his defense, argued that:

    Complainant was making scurrilous attacks against him and his family. Since he had no access to radio time, he opted for paid advertisements via newspaper to answer the attacks,as a measure of self-defense.

   Complainant, as a media man and member of the fourth estate, occupied a position almost similar to a public functionary and should not be onion-skinned and be able to absorb the thrust of public scrutiny

RTC found Guingguing and Lim  guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. On appeal, the CA modified the penalty imposed but it affirmed the RTC's finding of guilt. Hence this petition.

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Petitioner's contentions:

   As editor-publisher of the Sunday Post and as a member of the fourth estate, the lower courts finding of guilt against him constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to freedom of speech and of the press.

    Lower courts also failed to appreciate their invocation of self-defense.

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WON the publication is libelous.

Held: No.

(1) the First Amendment was designed to protect expression even at its most rambunctious and vitriolic form.

(2) New York Times v. Sullivan established that a public official may not successfully sue for libel unless the official can prove actual malice, which was defined as with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. Lleeway was allowed even if the challenged statements were factually erroneous if honestly made.

Garrison v. Louisiana held that

 In any event, where the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth. . . .

Moreover, even where the utterance is false, the great principles of the Constitution which secure freedom of expression in this area preclude attaching adverse consequences to any except the knowing or reckless falsehood.

Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts expanded the actual malice test to cover not just public officials, but also public figures.

The public figure concept was later qualified in the case of Gertz v. Welch, Inc., which held that a private person should be able to recover damages without meeting the New York Times standard. In doing so, the US SC recognized the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation.

(3) We accepted in this jurisdiction the principles enunciated in these US cases specifically in New York Times and Garrission; Vasquez v. CA; Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong; Borjal v. CA.

(4)  As applied to the present petition, there are two main determinants: whether complainant is a public figure, and assuming that he is, whether the publication of the subject advertisement was made with actual malice.

    Cirse Choy Torralba is a public figure. He is a broadcast journalist hosting two radio programs aired over a large portion of the Visayas and Mindanao.

   As complainant was a public figure, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove actual malice on the part of Lim and P when the latter published the article subject matter of the complaint. Set otherwise, the prosecution must have established beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants knew the statements in the advertisement was false or nonetheless proceeded with reckless disregard as to publish it whether or not it was true.

It should thus proceed that if the statements made against the public figure are essentially true, then no conviction for libel can be had. Any statement that does not contain a provably false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection. An examination of the records of this case showed that the precis of information contained in the questioned publication were actually true

(5) It may have been inconvenient for the complainant that these matters may have been divulged, yet such information hardly falls within any realm of privacy complainant could invoke, since the pendency of these criminal charges are actually matters of public record.

The information, moreover, went into the very character and integrity of complainant to which his listening public has a very legitimate interest. Complainant hosts a public affairs program, one which he himself claimed was imbued with public character. By entering into this line of work, complainant in effect gave the public a legitimate interest in his life. He likewise gave them a stake in finding out if he himself had the integrity and character to have the right to criticize others for their conduct.

(6) In convicting the defendants, the lower courts paid particular heed to A354 of the RPC, which provides that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. This provision, as applied to public figures complaining of criminal libel, must be construed in light of the constitutional guarantee of free expression, and this Courts precedents upholding the standard of actual malice with the necessary implication that a statement regarding a public figure if true is not libelous. The provision itself allows for such leeway, accepting as a defense good intention and justifiable motive. The exercise of free expression, and its concordant assurance of commentary on public affairs and public figures, certainly qualify as justifiable motive, if not good intention.

DECISION: CA's decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE and Petitioner is ACQUITTED

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