Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)

Ponente: POWELL, J.

Facts:

In 1968, a Chicago police officer, Richard Nuccio, shot and killed Ronald Nelson. After the officer was convicted of second-degree murder, the victim's family retained a lawyer, Elmer Gertz, to represent them in civil action against the officer.

A year later, American Opinion, a publication of the John Birch Society, ran a series of articles falsely alleging that the existence of a Communist conspiracy to discredit local police agencies and thus facilitate their replacement by a national police force that could more effectively implement the dictatorship they planned to impose on the country.

One of those touched on the Nuccio case, claiming that the officer had been framed at his criminal trial and making strong allegations about Gertz. It claimed that he had orchestrated Nuccio's conviction and that he was a member of various communist front organizations. It further implied that he had a lengthy criminal record himself and used various anti-communist terms of abuse ("Leninist", "Communist-fronter") to describe him.

Elmer Gertz filed a diversity action for libel in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against  Robert Welch, Inc. (RWI). He claimed that the falsehoods published by respondent injured his reputation as a lawyer and a citizen.

After answering the complaint, RWI filed a pretrial motion for summary judgment, claiming a constitutional privilege against liability for defamation.

• Gertz was a public official or a public figure

• the article concerned an issue of public interest and concern.

For these reasons, RWI was entitled to invoke the privilege enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. Gertz should prove publication of defamatory falsehood "with ‘actual malice' -- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."

The court denied the motion, suggesting that Gertz would only need to prove negligence.

At the summing up, the court determined that he was neither a public figure nor a public official, and instructed the jury to consider only damages, including punitive damages. Gertz was awarded $50,000.

Following the jury verdict and on further reflection, the District Court concluded that the New York Times standard should govern the case even though Gertz was not a public official or public figure. It accepted RWI's contention that the privilege protected discussion of any public issue without regard to the status of a person defamed therein. Accordingly, the court entered judgment for respondent RWI.

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court

• RWI could assert the constitutional privilege because the article concerned a matter of public interest

• Gertz had failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that R had acted with "actual malice" as defined by New York Times. There was no evidence that the managing editor of American Opinion knew of the falsity of the accusations made in the article.

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WON a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against liability for the injury inflicted by those statements.

HELD: Yes. 

The protection of the New York Times privilege should be available to publishers and broadcasters of defamatory falsehood concerning public officials and public figures.

The holdings in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts are not justified solely by reference to the interest of the press and broadcast media in immunity from liability. Rather,  the New York Times rule states an accommodation between this concern and the limited state interest present in the context of libel actions brought by public persons.

However, the state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private individuals requires that a different rule should obtain with respect to them.

Reasons:

• Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication, and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy.

• An individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs.

The extension of the New York Times test proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a degree that is unacceptable. It would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of "general or public interest" and which do not - to determine, in the words of MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, "what information is relevant to self-government."

The "public or general interest" test for determining the applicability of the New York Times standard to private defamation actions inadequately serves both of the competing values at stake.

As so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.  This approach provides a more equitable boundary between the competing concerns involved here. It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation.

But this countervailing state interest extends no further than compensation for actual injury. The States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.

Reasons:

• Juries may award substantial sums as compensation for supposed damage to reputation without any proof that such harm actually occurred. The largely uncontrolled discretion of juries to award damages where there is no loss unnecessarily compounds the potential of any system of liability for defamatory falsehood to inhibit the vigorous exercise of First Amendment freedoms.

• The doctrine of presumed damages invites juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact.

• The States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs such as this petitioner gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of any actual injury.

Also justification for allowing awards of punitive damages against publishers and broadcasters held liable under state-defined standards of liability for defamation.

• In most jurisdictions jury discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused.

• And they remain free to use their discretion selectively to punish expressions of unpopular views.

• Like the doctrine of presumed damages, jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions.

FINDINGS: Gertz was not a public figure.

• At the time of publication he had never held any remunerative governmental position.

• Although petitioner was consequently well known in some circles, he had achieved no general fame or notoriety in the community.

• He played a minimal role at the coroner's inquest, and his participation related solely to his representation of a private client. He took no part in the criminal prosecution of Officer Nuccio. Moreover, he never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with the press and was never quoted as having done so. He plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome.

DECISION: the New York Times standard is inapplicable to this case and that the trial court erred in entering judgment for RWI. Because the jury was allowed to impose liability without fault and was permitted to presume damages without proof of injury, a new trial is necessary.  Reversed and remanded.