Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 154115, November 29, 2005

Summary: Viveca Lim Yu filed against her husband, Philip Sy Yu, an action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership on the grounds of marital infidelity and physical abuse. During trial, Viveca moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to certain officers of Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. to compel production of the insurance policy and application of a person suspected to be Philip's illegitimate child.

RTC Pasig denied the motion.

- the insurance contract is inadmissible evidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11-2000, issued by the Insurance Commission which prevents insurance companies/agents from divulging confidential and privileged information pertaining to insurance policies.

Viveca sought reconsideration of the Order, but the motion was denied.

Aggrieved, Viveca filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

CA reversed the RTC Order

- Viveca was merely seeking the production of the insurance application and contract, and was not yet offering the same as part of her evidence. Thus, Philip's objection to the admission of the documents was premature, and RTC's pronouncement that the documents are inadmissible, precipitate.

Philip filed a MR but to no avail. He then filed a petition for review on certiorari  before the SC.

SC affirmed the decision of the CA, and declared that the RTC acted in GAD.

- the insurance application and the insurance policy were yet to be presented in court, much less formally offered before it. In fact, Viveca was merely asking for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum. Even assuming that the documents would eventually be declared inadmissible, the RTC was not then in a position to make a declaration to that effect at that point. Thus, it barred the production of the subject documents prior to the assessment of its probable worth.

Doctrine: While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such power is exercised only when the evidence has been formally offered.

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Ponente: TINGA, J.

A Petition for review on certiorari of the CA Decision and Resolution

Facts:

Mar 15 1994, Viveca Lim Yu filed against her husband, Philip Sy Yu, an action for legal separation and dissolution of conjugal partnership on the grounds of marital infidelity and physical abuse. The case was filed before the RTC Pasig.

During trial, Viveca moved for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum to certain officers of Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. to compel production of the insurance policy and application of a person suspected to be Philip's illegitimate child.

RTC Pasig denied the motion.

- the insurance contract is inadmissible evidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11-2000, issued by the Insurance Commission which prevents insurance companies/agents from divulging confidential and privileged information pertaining to insurance policies.

- also, the production of the application and insurance contract would violate A280 of the Civil Code and S5 of the Civil Registry Law, both of which prohibit the unauthorized identification of the parents of an illegitimate child.

Viveca sought reconsideration of the Order, but the motion was denied.

Aggrieved, Vivecat filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. 

CA reversed the RTC Order

- Viveca was merely seeking the production of the insurance application and contract, and was not yet offering the same as part of her evidence. Thus, Philip's objection to the admission of the documents was premature, and RTC's pronouncement that the documents are inadmissible, precipitate.

- The contents of the insurance application and insurance documents cannot be considered as privileged information

- Circular Letter No.11-2000 was never intended to be a legal impediment in complying with lawful orders.

- Lastly, a trial court does not have the discretion to deny a party's privilege to tender excluded evidence, as this privilege allows said party to raise on appeal the exclusion of such evidence.

Philip filed a MR but to no avail.

Hence this present petition.

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Philip's Position:

- CA blundered in delving into errors of judgment supposedly committed by the trial court as if the petition filed therein was an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action.

- CA failed to show any specific instance of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in issuing the assailed Order.

- Additionally, Viveca had already mooted her petition before the CA when she filed her formal offer of rebuttal exhibits, with tender of excluded evidence before the trial court.

Viveca's Position:

- the details surrounding the insurance policy are crucial to the issue of Philip's infidelity and his financial capacity to provide support to her and their children.

- also, she had no choice but to make a tender of excluded evidence considering that she was left to speculate on what the insurance application and policy ruled out by the trial court would contain.

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Issue 1 of 3: WON the RTC acted in GAD in declaring that the documents irrelevant and inadmissible even before they were formally offered.

Held: Yes.

While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such power is exercised only when the evidence has been formally offered. For a long time, the Court has recognized that during the early stages of the development of proof, it is impossible for a trial court judge to know with certainty whether evidence is relevant or not, and thus the practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality should be avoided. As well elucidated in the case of [Prats & Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co]: 

xxx it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the SC, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the case for a new trial, a step which this court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the SC upon appeal, this court then has all the material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.

In the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance policy were yet to be presented in court, much less formally offered before it. In fact, Viveca was merely asking for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum when the trial court issued the assailed Order. Even assuming that the documents would eventually be declared inadmissible, the trial court was not then in a position to make a declaration to that effect at that point. Thus, it barred the production of the subject documents prior to the assessment of its probable worth.

Issue 2 of 3: Whether the information contained in the documents is privileged in nature.

Held: No.

The issue was clarified and settled by the Insurance Commissioner's opinion that the circular on which the trial court based its ruling was not designed to obstruct lawful court orders. Hence, there is no more impediment to presenting the insurance application and policy.

Issue 3 of 3:  WON Viveca's tender of excluded evidence has rendered her petition before the CA moot since the move evinced that she had another speedy and adequate remedy under the law.

Held: No.

S40, R132 provides:

Sec.40. Tender of excluded evidence.If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.

It is thus apparent that before tender of excluded evidence is made, the evidence must have been formally offered before the court. And before formal offer of evidence is made, the evidence must have been identified and presented before the court. While Viveca made a Tender of Excluded Evidence, such is not the tender contemplated by the above-quoted rule, for obviously, the insurance policy and application were not formally offered much less presented before the trial court. At most, said Tender of Excluded Evidence was a manifestation of an undisputed fact that the subject documents were declared inadmissible by the trial court even before these were presented during trial. It was not the kind of plain, speedy and adequate remedy which Viveca could have resorted to instead of the petition for certiorari she filed before the CA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of CA are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.