Co Kim Cham v. Tan Keh, G.R. No. L-5, September 17, 1945
Summary: Petitioner Kho Kim Cham filed a petition for mandamus wherein the petitioner prayed that the respondent judge Arsenio Dizon of the Court of First Instance of Manila be ordered to continue the proceedings in the civil case that was initiated when the country was under the Japanese regime. Respondent Judge Dizon reasoned that by virtue of the October 23 proclamation, he cannot continue the proceedings in the said case. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The Supreme Court held that in accordance to international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts under the Japanese sponsored governments were valid and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US and Filipino forces. The October 23 proclamation did not cover the judicial processes.
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Ponente: FERIA, J.
A petition for mandamus
Facts:
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, and on the next day their Commander in Chief proclaimed "the Military Administration under law over the districts occupied by the Army." In said proclamation, it was also provided that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."
On Jan 23 1942, a civil government named Philippine Executive Commission (PEC) was organized.
On Oct 14 1943, Republic of the Philippines (RP) was inaugurated.
Under both governments, no substantial change was likewise effected in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts and in the laws the courts administered and enforced.
During this time, civil case No 3012 was initiated.
On Oct 23, 1944, General MacArthur issued a proclamation which declared:
xxx xxx xxx
I do enjoin upon all loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect for and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the laws, regulations and other acts of their duly constituted government whose seat is now firmly re-established on Philippine soil.
Respondent judge refused to continue the proceedings in the said case on the ff grounds:
(1) the Oct 23
proclamation invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments
of the courts of the Japanese sponsored government.
(2) proceedings and
processes having been before a court of the RP and in accordance w/ laws and
regulations of the said RP, the same are now valid and w/out legal effect
(3) lower courts
have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct RP in the absence of an enabling law
granting such authority.
(4) defunct governments were not de facto governments.
Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court.
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Issue 1 of 3: Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces.
Held: Yes.
SC ruled that in political and international law all acts of a de facto government are good and valid, that the governments established during the Japanese occupation. that is, the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines, were de facto governments, and that it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of those governments, "which are not of a political complexion," were good and valid, and by virtue of the principle of postliminium, remain good and valid after the liberation.
Now, were the PEC and the RP de facto governments? The answer is yes.
There are 3 recognized de facto governments:
(1) that government
that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the
majority, the rightful legal governments and maintains itself against the will
of the latter
(2) that which is
established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory
of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of
paramount force.
(3) that established
as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in
insurrection against the parent state
PEC and RP were of the second kind. And this is so, the Court said, even when they were run mostly by the Filipinos as the ultimate source of their authority was still the Japanese military authority and government.
Issue 2 of 3: Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief of the United States Army, in which he declared "that all laws, regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts.
Held: No.
Although
the phrase “ all laws, regulations and processes of any other
government” are broad in scope, it should not be construed to include judicial
processes. A well-known rule of statutory construction states that "a
statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains."
Nullfying judicial processes would go against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the US SC, embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907, and likewise enshrined in our Constitution.
US SC: Williams v. Bruffy
As far as the Acts of the States do not impair
or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights
of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be treated as
valid and binding.
Horn v. Lockhart
The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws.
The Hague Conventions of
1907, Sec 3 Art 43
The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the later shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.
Sec 3, Art 2 of the PH
Constitution
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation.
Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public hardship would result, and great public interests would be endangered and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled accrued or vested rights nullified, sentences passed on criminals set aside, and criminals might easily become immune for evidence against them may have already disappeared or be no longer available. It is another well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided.
This construction is impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37. Said Executive order abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided "that all case which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court final decision." This provision impliedly recognizes that the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese military occupation have not been invalidated by the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, because the said Order does not say or refer to cases which have been duly appealed to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases which had therefore, that is, up to March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of by the latter before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending on March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance during the Japanese regime.
Issue 3 of 3: If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.
Held: Yes.
Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect.
The Japanese Forces followed this practice when they established the Military Administration, the PEC and finally, the RP. Courts were continued without substantial change in their organization and jurisdiction.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings.
DECISION: In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court.
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
The word “processes” in Paragraph 3 of the said proclamation includes judicial processes. Process is synonymous with proceedings or procedures and embraces all the steps and proceedings in a judicial cause from it commencement to its conclusion.
Such interpretation is supported by the preamble of the proclamation.
The second "Whereas," states that so-called government styled as the "Republic of the Philippines," based upon neither the free expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States, and is purporting to the exercise Executive, Judicial, and Legislative powers of government over the people."
It is evident from the above-mentioned words that it was the purpose of General MacArthur to declare null and void all acts of government under the Japanese regime, and he used, in section 3 of he dispositive part, the word laws, as pertaining to the legislative branch, the word regulations, as pertaining to the executive branch, and lastly, the word processes, as pertaining to the judicial branch of the government which functioned under the Japanese regime.
When the words of an instrument are free from ambiguity and doubt, and express plainly, clearly and distinctly the sense of the framer, there is no occasion to resort to other means of interpretation. It is not allowable to interpret what needs no interpretation.
Is there any principle of international law that may effect the October Proclamation?
No principle of international law has been, or could be invoked as a basis for denying the author of the document legal authority to issue the same or any part thereof.
It is stated more than once, and reiterated with dogmatic emphasis, that under the principles of international law the judicial processes under an army occupation cannot be invalidated.
If General MacArthur, as commander in Chief of the American Armed Forces of Liberation, had authority, full and legal, to issue the proclamation, the inescapable result will be the complete voidance and nullity of all judicial processes, procedures, and proceedings of all courts under the Japanese regime.
The Majority Opinion has 3 weakneses:
(1) No
authority has been cited to support the absolute and sweeping character of the
majority proposition that:
xxxx in political and international law that all acts of a de facto government are good and valid xxx.
(2) Self contradicting arguments
(a)It is maintained that when General MacArthur declared the processes of the governments under the Japanese regime null and void, he could not refer to judicial processes, because the same are valid and remained so under the legal truism announced by the majority to the effect that, under political and international law, all official acts of a de facto government, legislative, executive or judicial, are valid.
Now if the reasoning of the majority to the effect that General MacArthur could not refer to judicial processes because they are good and valid in accordance with international law, why should the same reasoning not apply to legislative and executive processes?
(b)It is admitted that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation as an agent of his government, "may not unlawfully suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied territory if and when exigencies of the military occupation demand such action," but it is doubted whether the commanding general of the army of the restored legitimate government can exercise the same broad legislative powers.
Why can a commanding general of an army of occupation, of a rebellious army, of an invading army, or of a usurping army, should enjoy greater legal authority during the illegal ocupation than the official representative of the legitimate government.
(c) The majority opinion recognizes in the military occupant the power to annul the official acts of the ousted and supplanted legitimate government, a privilege which is inversely denied to the last.
The military occupants is duty bound to protect the civil rights of the inhabitants, but why should the legitimate government necessarily validate the measures adopted by the said occupant in the performance of this duty, if the legitimate government believes his duty to annul them for weighty reasons?
The military occupant is duty bound to establish courts of justice. Why should the legitimate government validate the acts of said courts, if it is convinced that said courts were absolutely powerless, as was the case during the Japanese occupation, to stop the horrible abuses of the military police, to give relief to the victims of zoning and Fort Santiago tortures, to protect the fundamental human rights of the Filipinos — life, property, and personal freedom?
(3) Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission, known as the Organic Act of the courts of justice of the Philippines, is the one that defines the jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts, Courts of First Instance, and the Supreme Court.
No provision may be found in Act. No. 136, nor in any other law of the Philippines, conferring on the Commonwealth tribunals jurisdiction to continue the judicial processes or proceedings of tribunals belonging to other governments, such as the governments established during the Japanese occupation. In order to exercise said jurisdiction an enabling act of the Congress is necessary.
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HILADO,
J., dissenting
provided 5 reasons:
1. The proceedings in said civil case No. 3012 are null and void under General of the Army MacArthur's proclamation of October 23, 1944
Paragraph 3 of the said proclamation is clear, when it says “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government” are “null and void”. It says all, and it says null and void, meaning null and void ab initio.
The proceedings in question were unquestionably "processes" of the Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines within the meaning of the aforesaid proclamation, and hence could not very well be considered by the parties to be valid and binding, at least after October 23, 1944, without said parties incurring in disobedience and contempt of the proclamation (see last paragraph of the proclamation)
2. (a) The government styled as, first, the "Philippine Executive Commission "and later as the Republic of the Philippines", established here by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces or by his order was not a de-facto government — the so-called Court of First Instance of Manila was not a de facto court, and the judge who presided it was not a de facto judge;
PEC and the RP was established under duress, and hence it must be presumed that the judge who presided over the proceedings in question during the Japanese occupation, firstly, accepted his appointment under duress; and secondly, acted by virtue of that appointment under the same duress. In such circumstances he could not have acted in the bona fide belief that the new "courts" created by or under the orders of the Japanese Military Commander in chief had been legally created--among them the "Court of first Instance of Manila," — that the Chairman of the "Philippine Executive Commission" or the President of the "Republic of the Philippines", whoever appointed him, and conferred upon him a valid title to his office and a legitimate jurisdiction to act as such judge.
(b) the rules of International Law regarding the establishment of a de facto Government in territory belonging to a belligerent but occupied or controlled by an opposing belligerent are inapplicable to the governments thus established here by Japan.
Art 2, Sec 3 of the Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of International Law but precludes that law which supports the power or right of a belligerent army of occupation to set up a provisional government on occupied enemy territory. Such law is only applicable to those countries who have not renounced war as an instrument of national policy. PH has. As such, PH cannot recognize the governments setup by the Japanese Forces, and as a corollary, it follows that PH has no legal foundation on which to base the proposition that the acts of that Japanese-sponsored government in the Philippines were valid and binding.
3. The courts of those governments were entirely different from our Commonwealth courts before and after the Japanese occupation.
The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth courts was defined and conferred under the Commonwealth Constitution and the pertinent legislation enacted thereunder, that of the Japanese-sponsored courts was defined and conferred by the orders and decrees of the Japanese Commander in Chief, and, perhaps, the decrees of the "Philippine Executive Commission" and the laws of the so-called Legislature under the Republic, which was not composed of the elected representatives of the people.
The Justices and Judges of the Commonwealth courts had to be appointed by the President of the Commonwealth with confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, pursuant to the Commonwealth Constitution. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, under the "Philippine Executive Commission" was appointed by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces, and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Judges of first Instance and of all inferior courts were appointed by the Chairman of the Executive Commission, at first, and later, by the President of the Republic, of course, without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the Commonwealth Constitution.
Executive Order No. 36 of the President of the Philippines acknowledged this by ordering the State "to re-establish the courts as fast as provinces are liberated from the Japanese occupation." If the courts under the Japanese-sponsored government of the "Republic of the Philippines" were the same Commonwealth courts that existed here under the Constitution at the time of the Japanese invasion, President Osmeña would not be speaking of re-establishing those courts.
Hence, any jurisdiction possessed by the former and any cases left pending therein, were not and could not be automatically transferred to the Commonwealth courts which we re-established under Executive Order No. 36. For the purpose, a special legislation was necessary.
4. The question boils down to whether the Commonwealth Government, as now restored, is to be bound by the acts of either or both of those Japanese-sponsored governments.
It should not be bound not only upon the ground of the legal principles but also for the reasons of national dignity and international decency. To give any measure of validity or binding effect to the proceedings of the Japanese-sponsored courts, would be to give that much validity or effect to the acts of the invaders.
5. Even consideration of policy of practical convenience militate against petitioner's contention.
Given the dire economic situation back then, and the fear and hatred Filipinos felt for the Japanese, only few causes was actually brought to the courts. As such more people would actually be prejudiced than would be benefitted by a wholesale validation of the said proceedings.
Much concern has been shown for the possible confusion which might result from a decision declaring null and void the acts processes of the Japanese-sponsored governments in the Philippines. This aspect of the question has been unduly stressed. The situation is not without remedy, but the remedy lies with the legislature and not with the courts. As the courts cannot create a new or special jurisdiction for themselves, which is a legislative function, and as the situation demands such new or special jurisdiction, let the legislature act in the premises. For instance, the Congress may enact a law conferring a special jurisdiction upon the courts of its selection, whereby said courts may, after hearing all the parties interested, and taking all the necessary safeguards, so that, a party's day in court or other constitutional or statutory right under the Commonwealth Government should not be prejudiced by any of said acts, processes or proceedings, particularly, those in Japanese-sponsored courts.
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